On July 25, 2018, Pakistan voted to elect the 22nd Prime Minister (PM) of the country. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party won the highest number of seats in the National Assembly (NA) elections, and its Chairman, Imran Khan, was anointed as the Prime Minister-designate. Since PTI did not win a clear majority, Khan will form a coalition government with smaller parties and some independent candidates. In fact, even on the eve of his oath-taking ceremony on 18th August, efforts were underway to build this coalition.
In this general elections, PTI emerged as the single largest party, winning 116 NA seats of the total 270; but it could not cross the majority mark of 136. Nevertheless, PTI will form the government at the Centre; in the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) provincial assemblies; and will be part of a multi-party coalition in the Balochistan provincial assembly. In the Sindh provincial assembly, it will function as the main opposition party. Centre-state coordination could improve under the Khan-led coalition government as his party holds substantial electoral influence in at least three provinces.
Khan’s victory was mired in controversy amid reports and allegations by the opposition political parties of election rigging and other irregularities. As a result, his first challenge will be to prove his party’s majority in the parliament and then sustain the coalition with different partners amid the formation of a (dis)jointed grand opposition alliance. Additionally, Khan will need to address the looming economic crisis, multiple foreign policy issues, and internal security concerns in the initial months of him taking office.
His tenure as the PM will not be smooth as he faces multifarious domestic and external challenges. The opposition parties may create instability by bringing people out on the streets and paralysing the government machinery. That will be a déjà vu moment for Khan, who organised dharnas (street protests) after the 2013 general elections on the issue of alleged vote rigging.
Furthermore, the first “100 days” of Khan’s government will play a crucial role in determining the popularity and stability of the alliance. Governing the country for next five years with a thin majority in the parliament will remain the foremost challenge for the PTI-led coalition government. While expectations from Khan are high, it would be unfair to expect quick resolution of longstanding issues from the new dispensation in Islamabad.
Khan’s victory was mired in controversy amid reports and allegations by the opposition political parties of election rigging and other irregularities. As a result, his first challenge will be to prove his party’s majority in the parliament and then sustain the coalition with different partners amid the formation of a (dis)jointed grand opposition alliance.
Table 1 2018 National Assembly Elections Results
| Sr. No | Party | NA Seats |
| 1 | Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) | 116 |
| 2 | Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) | 64 |
| 3 | Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) | 43 |
| 4 | Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) | 12 |
| 5 | Muttahida Qaumi Movement-Pakistan (MQM-P) | 6 |
| 6 | Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) | 4 |
| 7 | Balochistan Awami Party (BAP) | 4 |
| 8 | Balochistan National Party (BNP) | 3 |
| 9 | Grand Democratic Alliance (GDA) | 2 |
| 10 | Awami National Party (ANP) | 1 |
| 11 | Awami Muslim League (AML) | 1 |
| 12 | Jamhoori Wattan Party (JWP) | 1 |
| 13 | Independent Candidates | 13 |
Factionalism within political parties is not uncommon. However, splits within PTI are already evident as it took a few rounds of negotiations and Khan’s intervention for the party to nominate the new Chief Minister of KP. Although selecting the federal cabinet ministers may be relatively easier, the large numbers of ‘electables’, independents and allies from smaller parties will claim their personal and political stakes–necessitating compromises.
Moreover, PTI may find it difficult to manage the multi-party coalition. Khan will need to hold the PTI’s alliances–which comprise difficult partners like the MQM-P–together both at the Centre and in Punjab. Both parties have been rivals in the political arena for some time now, but PTI (which is a relatively new party) managed to capture some of the political space in Sindh that was otherwise held by MQM-P. Will MQM-P allow PTI to further consolidate its electoral gains in the province or scuttle it by leveraging its support at the crucial junctures? Coalitions are never easy to manage, but the levels of rivalry and mutual distrust define and determine the future of the alliance.
Factionalism within political parties is not uncommon. However, splits within PTI are already evident as it took a few rounds of negotiations and Khan’s intervention for the party to nominate the new Chief Minister of KP.
Moreover, the strong opposition in the NA, Senate and the Punjab provincial assembly will pose significant challenges whenever the new government seeks to legislate. This is why Khan will have to conduct himself more as a national figure than merely as a firebrand chief of a political party; and this would entail making compromises with the opposition, including with arch-rivals such as PPP’s Asif Ali Zardari and PML-N’s Shehbaz Sharif. A Senate strongly in the hands of the opposition parties will also pose formidable challenge.
Finally, there is the important issue of election legitimacy. The opposition parties have been crying hoarse over alleged manipulation before and after the elections. They have already joined hands to protest inside and outside the parliament over the rigging issue. Politico-religious figures such as Jamiat Ulema Islam-Fazal (JUI-F) leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Barelvi leader Khadim Rizvi have been attacking Khan and alleged ‘patrons’ of the military establishment on the issue. Prospects of street protests in the coming months present a conundrum for Khan’s government. The display of street power and inflammatory rhetoric even before Khan took office indicates that his tenure will be far from smooth.
Handling the economic crisis will be an immediate priority for Khan’s government. Faced with an acute economic crisis, Pakistan’s incoming Finance Minister, Asad Umar, estimated that the economy may need an infusion of over US $12 billion in loans[1] within six weeks. In an interview with Bloomberg, Umar said the deficit is estimated to be between US $10 billion and US $12 billion, albeit the new government would need a bit extra so that it does not “live on the edge.”
Following widespread criticism of the opacity of the terms under which loans were received from Beijing for the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), he promised to make all agreements with China public. Pakistan could turn to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), friendly countries and issue Diaspora bonds to bolster the country’s depleting reserves. Many investors and analysts view a bailout from China or the IMF as inevitable–and it would not be the first time it would have approached the IMF for support. Pakistan has witnessed decades of debt blowouts, balance-of-payment crises and 12 IMF[2] programmes since the late 1980s.
Faced with an acute economic crisis, Pakistan’s incoming Finance Minister, Asad Umar, estimated that the economy may need an infusion of over US $12 billion in loans within six weeks.
However, the US has already signalled its opposition to any IMF bailout. The amount of Chinese loans given to Pakistan over the last 13 months alone is almost equal to the IMF’s previous bailout of US $6.6 billion. Those heavy debts from Beijing have prompted worries from US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who said he would be watching to see if Khan’s new government uses IMF funds to pay off the opaque Chinese loans. Umar said he would bring more transparency to the $60 billion worth CPEC projects in Pakistan and advised the US to not worry about Pakistan’s “Chinese debt.”[3]
In addition to domestic and economic issues, the new government will face multi-pronged foreign policy challenges such as balancing relations with China and the US; addressing the Afghanistan issue; balancing its ties with Saudi Arabia and Iran; and maintaining the status quo with India. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s foreign and security policy will remain the domain of the country’s powerful military establishment and Khan’s government will have a limited say in formulating new policies, if any.
US-Pakistan bilateral relations are at a new low and there is a possibility of further deterioration of ties under the new civilian leadership in Islamabad. Recently, Washington warned[4] against any IMF bailout for Islamabad, which it fears the latter might use to repay its debts to China. The US also suspended funds for training Pakistani officers under the US government’s International Military Education and Training Programme. Moreover, the Afghanistan issue remains the main bone of contention between the two countries. Washington is clearly unhappy with Pakistan’s dubious role in Afghanistan. While Khan will likely follow the establishment’s policy on Afghanistan, he might undertake efforts to increase engagement with Afghan government.
The new government will face multi-pronged foreign policy challenges such as balancing relations with China and the US; addressing the Afghanistan issue; balancing its ties with Saudi Arabia and Iran; and maintaining the status quo with India.
In his post-election victory speech, Khan prioritised enhancing bilateral relations with China. Beijing will undoubtedly remain the first foreign policy priority for the new government in Islamabad. Like his predecessor, Khan too will rely on China for diplomatic, economic and military support for the next five years. Beijing declared a loan of US $2 billion mere days after the election results were announced. Moreover, Khan has envisioned following China’s model of development and governance during his five-year term as Pakistan’s PM. China-Pakistan relations have remained stable, especially after the launch of the CPEC project. However, issues related to transparency of various projects and their paces of progress could soon require a review which might create some differences.
On India, Khan will continue to follow the status quo and may not ‘cosy up’ with New Delhi until he gets a ’green signal’ from the military establishment. However, he expressed a desire to improve relations with India in his victory speech, and recently met India’s High Commissioner to Pakistan. New Delhi may cautiously reciprocate to initial signals coming from Islamabad. As various state elections and the 2019 Lok Sabha elections are due in India next year, New Delhi will play safe in its engagement with Khan’s military-backed government. India can expect further internationalisation of the Kashmir issue under the new civilian leadership in Pakistan. Nonetheless, a meeting between Khan and his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, could take place on the sidelines of a multilateral summit.
On India, Khan will continue to follow the status quo and may not ‘cosy up’ with New Delhi until he gets a ’green signal’ from the military establishment. However, he expressed a desire to improve relations with India in his victory speech, and recently met India’s High Commissioner to Pakistan.
Meanwhile, despite Khan’s stated desire for better relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, he is likely to face an uphill challenge while balancing Pakistan’s bilateral relations between the two West Asian heavyweights. With Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the region might witness new political and security developments over the next five years. Khan seeks to play an active role in mediating the conflict in West Asia. So far, it is unclear how he plans to achieve this, or the extent to which Pakistan can leverage its bilateral relations with Riyadh and Tehran to become a bridge between the two.
Before the elections, there were apprehensions that a fragmented NA and fragile coalition would lead to instability. However, now, Khan seems well placed to initiate the ambitious and detailed reform agenda outlined in PTI’s manifesto[5] towards a ‘Naya‘ (new) Pakistan: transforming governance; strengthening the federation; inclusive economic growth; improving agricultural infrastructure, dams and water conservation; revolutionising social services; and ensuring Pakistan’s national security. On a domestic level, at its core, the reforms agenda seeks to turn Pakistan into an ‘Islamic welfare state’ where rule of law, meritocracy and transparency would be guaranteed to all and a social welfare safety net would be provided to the marginalised and the elderly.
It is a multi-dimensional and integrated reform agenda but Khan’s government might have to prioritise the agenda issues because simultaneous movement on all fronts would not be practically possible. The PTI does not have a two-thirds majority needed to push constitutional amendments required for some reforms on its agenda such as making South Punjab a separate province. Achieving such objectives will require both caution and skilful political manoeuvring to garner coalition support on these issues. It is possible that the PTI-led coalition government in Punjab may try to create a forward block from the ranks of its rival PML-N. However, such an action could lead to polarisation, demonstrations, sit-ins, and gridlocks–tactics the PTI employed to erode the previous government’s influence.
Indeed, issues like a coalition government at the centre, widespread allegations of election rigging, a strong opposition in the parliament, pressing foreign policy issues, looming economic crises, etc are formidable challenges for a government that has an ambitious reform agenda. However, Khan may utilise his party’s political influence in three provinces in addition to the Centre, to implement his reform agenda. With the exception of Sindh, where the PTI faces a comfortably-placed PPP government, improved centre-state coordination in the remaining provinces could make the implementation component more viable for the new government.
[1] Pakistan to Decide on More Than $12 Billion Bailout in Six Weeks; “Faseeh Mangi and Kamran Haider”, Bloomberg, 2 August 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-02/pakistan-to-decide-on-more-than-12-billion-bailout-in-six-weeks
[2] IMF Bailout Looms For Pakistan as Debt Surge Raises Alarm; “Kamran Haider and Faseeh Mangi”, Bloomberg, 31 May 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-30/imf-bailout-looms-for-pakistan-as-debt-surge-raises-alarm
[3] Pakistan to Decide on More Than $12 Billion Bailout in Six Weeks; “Faseeh Mangi and Kamran Haider”, Bloomberg, 2 August 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-02/pakistan-to-decide-on-more-than-12-billion-bailout-in-six-weeks
[4] U.S.’ Pompeo warns against IMF bailout for Pakistan that aids China; “Reuters Staff”, 31 July 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imf-pakistan/us-pompeo-warns-against-imf-bailout-for-pakistan-that-aids-china-idUSKBN1KK2G5
[5] PTI Manifesto Final — 2018; PTI, 9 July 2018, https://www.scribd.com/document/383487528/PTI-Manifesto-Final-2018#from_embed
The author is a researcher, at the Centre for Internal and Regional Security (IReS), Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi
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